## V. w. 12/21.1.13

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12.3

## MORITZ and IBIS Rewrits

MORITZ reports began on 5/12/41, though they were not at first headed "MORITZ". Up to 6/1/43 there have been 502 MORITZ reports, known to us from Service 7/23. These represent a large fraction but certainly not the whole of those sant by SOFIA to VIEWA.

The majority of these reports have been received by VIENBA within 24-28 hours of their dispatch from (?) Egypt, and in most ascertainable cases within 48 hours of the happengins reported on.
MORITZ reports are deemed reliable enough to be forwarded from BERLIN to the Abwehr Office, with KESSELING and sometimes to the Naval Intelligence Officers of SOFIL and ATHEE. They has known to be not always accurate but ESSELFING's thereby Officer complains if the supply dries up.

The Spanish Ambussed that 'NRUR. Ministor PROT', who desided all Luftmeldekopf intelligence is approantly, to be keet quiet with MORITZ and IBIS reports. MOX reports for special ressons, are clearly not going to be given to him. So MORITZ is not thought to merit the highest degree of security.

MORITZ reports give military, naval and sir force intelligence as well as some which is primarily political. Bout a quarter of the reports deal with sir force matters, about a seventh with marine matters, the rest with military plus a few political matters. The sir force and marine intelligence is as a rule more detailed than are the reports on troop movements, etc. Airfield equipment and convoy compositions are described with an appearance of precision. Troop-strengths are not estimated. MORITZ seldom districts military, mayal or air force units, save in so far as he occasionally mentions their meticalities. Battle-order particulars are not often given. The reports appear generally to issue from the visual observations of MORITZ or from hearsay and not from official documents or from questioning.


In one case MORITZ was to be instructed to keep the serodrome of BURG EL ARAB, west of Alexandria, under continuous observation for at least 10 days, reporting on the number of niroraft and mentioning the time of observation. He was not instructed to ask any questions. (There is no sign that he fulfilled this assignment).

MORITZ reports deal with the following areas: ECIPT. LIBYA.
TRIPOLITAMIA, SYRIA, PALESTINE, CYPRUS, IRAK, IRAN, SUDAN, RED SEA,
PERSIAN CULF. It is noteworthy that while about a third of his
first hundred reports dealt with SYRI- and PALESTINE, only three or
four of his last hundred do so. It is still more noteworthy that
from about the middle of November MORITZ reports have dealt with
LYBYA, CYREMAICA, and TRIPOLITAMIA, almost to the exclusion of



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anything else. ROBAUL DEED LITT GARRIE DIFTS seem to be the successive origins of MO-ITZ reports over the last two months.

MORITZ intelligence seems to bell from the area DERNA round 20/11.42, from area BENGHAZI during the last ten days of Hovember and early December, from area BENGHAZI AGEDABI, during second and third weeks of December, from AGEILA and area AGEILA-SIRTE during the first week of January. What is general knowledge in Alexandria and Cairo no longer features largely, as it had done before, in MORITZ reports. The inference is that MCRITZ has moved west with the Eighth Army, and that before this advance he and been at a base in Egypt, probably near ALEXAMDRIA.


The promptitude of his reports proves that he must be in W/T contact with Sofia or with a remanent intermediate relaying-station working to SOFIA. The former is the more economical supposition. In either case, if he is with the Fighth Army, he must be either an authorised W/T operator or the controller of an authorised W/T station, doing Abwehr work in the side. He must also be able to encipher and decipher messages.

He must then communicate with Sofia (or an intermediate relaying-station) with a cipher and W/T procedure which resemble his normal authorised cipher and procedure. He must transmit nearly every day. (Some possibly significant gaps will be mentioned later).

On 16.3.42 Sofia passed a MCHITZ message to Vienna at 1512
ONT. The report mentioned the mival of an one ican lim Force
Mission at SUEZ carly on that same day. As Sofia could beadly
receive, decipher, applicate, perhaps cowrite and re-encipher the
report in less than an hour, MCHITZ must have transmitted from
Report before say 1,000 hours on that day. Similarly on 19.3.42
MORITZ must have sent his report 1500 hours on that day. On 16.6
he must have transmitted before 1800 hours on that MCRITZ sometimes
transmits fairly early in the day. On an ordinary day MCRITZ's
transmits fairly early in the day. On an ordinary day MCRITZ's
transmits fairly early in the day. On an ordinary day MCRITZ's
transmits detailed particulars about airfields, his BURG EL ARAB
assignment and the fact that he works for I buft suggest that he
may have some connection with the R.A.F. or some Allied Air Force.
And he should have been at BURG RL ARAB in the latter half of
August. (Of course MCRITZ may stand for a collection of persons,
in which case the man at BURG RL ARAB need not now be in TRIPOLITANIA).

There has been nothing to indicate in what language MORITZ's messages are originally written. (he might he a Lisison Officer between the R.A.F. and an Allied Air Force. This might give him chances of visiting in person Syris, S. Irak, etc. or of contacting officers who do so).

//- - insert "and on the 17th before 1600 hours: on 15.5 before 1700 hours







## MORITZ's External Sources

Until the middle of November, NO 172 would seem to have been in Egypt, probably bared on 'lex nd in though with some freedom of movement. During this on lod which the bulk of the intelligence secured dealt with what could have been observed on overheard in Egypt, a considerable part consisted of aports; often that, from SYRIA, PALESTINE, CYPRUS, IRAK, I Wand other remote blaces. How did MORITZ secure this intelligence?


It is clear that the intelligence was not sent from say, BRIGUT, HAIFA, CYPRUS, BAGDAD, etc. direct to SOFIA, clse it would not have dried up in the middle of November. Moreover, the tidings from, say, CYPRUS or BAMDER SHAHPUR came at irregular incorvals and often in splashes, which independent W/T services would have obviated. Somehow the intelligence came quickly to MORITZ, who sent it alongside of Egyptian and Libyan intelligence to SOFIA.

There is nothing to show what these outside sources were or how they communicated the news to MORITZ (save that the time evaluable rules out maything but W/Tor land-line).

It is possible that MORITZ has informants stationed in or visiting all or most of the localities from which these reports come. In this case they would, perhaps, communicate by sub-resery use of an authorised transmitted. Alternatively, the intelligence may come to MORITZ's office as to an official clearing-house, some of which MORITZ steels for his private use. In this case MORITZ would have to be working for an Intelligence organisation such as the Staff of one of the Services. The intelligence itself seems not to be of any one restricted type, but political information, lots morela, disaffection, etc., bulk anther largely.

- Note 1: There have been the following gaps in the saries of MOHITZ reports. Some of them may have been due to trouble in interreports. Some of them may have open due to trouble in interception, or to holidays or preoccupation in SOFIA. 29/3/42 - 7/4/42; 20/4/42 - 25/4/52: 11/5/42 - 15/5/42; 20/5/42 - 2/6/42; 20/7/42 - 25/7/40; 2/10/42 - 6/10/42; 31/10/42 - 3/11/42; 12/11/42 - 16/11/42: 21/12/42 - 2/1/43. If a possible MORITZ is found, some of his spells of absence, if any, should coincide with some of these gaps. But as, mornally, a message sent by MORITZ on Wednesday, say, is not passed on from Sofia to Vienna till Thursday or Friday, his dates of inaction would be one or two days anterior to these gap-dates.
- A MORITZ report sent to Vienna on 11/1/43 reads "Staff of 8th Army received report on 9/1 that preparations at BERAT EL HEUS for offensive will be completed between 11 and 15 Junuary. Reports are from Air Porce and Southern Army Orange. This is one of the fax indications we have of MORITZ's sources. Bote 2:





Between 28/3/42 and 6/1/43 w3 have 143 IBIS reports on Service 7/23; the actual number sent was probably a good bit higher. They are usually fairly 'hot', though they tend to be 2 to 3 days old, while MAX and MORITZ reports tend to be 1 to 2 days old. Their acope extends over TUIKEY in early days) EGYPT, SYRIA, IBAM, IRAK, SUDAM, FRENCH EQUATORIAL AFRICA.

Diving the first two months, nounly all the memo to deal with TURKEY. Them, after may by two months' interval, them started to deal with the British Middle Francisco. IRAR, SUD N. EGYPT. SYPIA, CYPRUS. etc. Since them only in the base least with TURKEY.

The reports have been, on the whole of the same of them as MORITZ reports, though the openion of it intelligence is slightly lower, and they are sometimes, though not olways inferior in precision of detail.

IBIS reports are not deemed so variable as MORITZ reports. They are fewer in number, and there have been several long intermissions (e.g. 16/5/42 - 9/7/42; 1/9/42 - 9/9/42; 23/9/42 - 30/9/42; 24/10/42 - 10/11/42; 10/11/42 - 4/12/42; 4/12/42 - 16/12/42). His transmissions would be shorter than MORITZ's; on 29/8/42 he must have transmitted before 1600 hours.


There is slight evidence that the IBIS transmitted (or operator) is not identical with MURITZ's; for on one or two occasions IBIS sends messages during a period when MORITZ has a few days' activity. But there could be other explanations for this.

It is reasonable to suppose that IBIS was in Turkey from March to May, and only bogan to work from Egypt in July. But MORITZ had been working from Egypt since December.

IBIS has not been injected by MORITZ's recent preoccupation with Cyrensican and Tripolitanian intelligence.

There is nothing to show in what language TPIS reports are written, or whether there are any connections between IBIS and MORITZ (one or two reports are closely similar). The general similarity between MORITZ and IBIS reports in respect of style content and areas dealt with suggests that the persons issuing them have similar facilities, contacts and functions.

The personnel and organization of the Luftmeldekopf, SCPIA, the character and sources of MAX, MOSITZ, IBIS and SMER reports and the routing of Luftmendekopf intelligence to various operational staffs have been discussed in:





- a) V.w. Report 24 of 24/4/42 (THE LUFTWELDEKOPF, SOMIAL.
- b) V.w. Report 25 of 4/5/42 'M/T COLLECTION AND DISPOSAL OF OPERATIONAL INTILLIGENCE, BY THE ABWERR IN NEAF AND MIDDLE EAST!.
- e) V.w. Report 31 of 4/8/42 'THE SOUTCES OF LUFTHTLDEKOPF REPORTS.'
- d) V.W Report 37 of 27/10/42 \*ABWEMR NAVAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICES IN NEAR AND MID EAST.\*

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